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ACTION PM-00

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INFO LOG-00 COR-01 ACDA-17 COME-00 CFE-00 C-01 OASY-00
EB-00 EUR-00 HA-09 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-19
L-00 ADS-00 NRRC-00 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-02
PRS-01 P-01 SDEL-00 SNP-00 SP-00 SSO-00 SS-00
STR-16 TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00 CORE-00 SNIS-00 NISC-02
SSD-01 /081W

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O 011618Z SEP 93 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KIEV
TO DNA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
OSIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
DOE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0976
INFO USMISSION USNATO
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY MINSK
AMEMBASSY ALMATY

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (T E X T)

DEPT FOR ACDA; T, PM, EUR
DOE FOR ALESSI/DP-5
JCS FOR J-5 DDIN
SECDEF FOR SSD/AE OSD/ISP OUSD(A)/S&SS, AND DIA/ODB-6
CIA FOR CHIEF/ACIS
OSIA FOR DIRECTOR, DEP DIR-IA-IRO
NSC FOR GOTTEMUELLER
NRC FOR SHERR
DNA/OPAC
GENEVA FOR BIEDLINGMAIER

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PARM, PREL, UP, US
SUBJECT: SSD: AUGUST 31 MEETINGS

REF: (A) STATE 264490 (B) STATE 265224

1. THIS IS SSD-93IV-013. UNCLASSIFIED - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: THE DELEGATION MET IN THE MORNING ON THE UMBRELLA AND THE IMPLEMENTING AGREEMENTS AND AMBASSADOR GOODBY HAD A SERIES OF MEETINGS IN THE AFTERNOON WITH UKRAINIAN OFFICIALS. WHILE THE SIDES WERE ABLE TO NARROW THE ISSUES IN THE UMBRELLA SIGNIFICANTLY, THE UKRAINIAN SIDE INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD BE UNABLE TO SIGN. GOODBY THEN REQUESTED THAT THE GOU PREPARE ASAP A LETTER LAYING OUT THE CHANGES IT NEEDS IN THE DRAFT TEXT IN ORDER TO SIGN THE AGREEMENT. PROGRESS ON THE SNDV AND GGCL IMPLEMENTING AGREEMENTS WAS LIMITED, WITH MANY OUTSTANDING ISSUES REMAINING. IN THE CASE OF THE

SNDV AGREEMENT, THE MAJOR REMAINING ISSUE WAS THE UKRAINIAN INSISTENCE AND U.S. REFUSAL TO INCLUDE A QUOTE BUY UKRAINIAN UNQUOTE PROVISION IN THE AGREEMENT. ON EXPORT CONTROL, AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON THE TEXT OF AN IMPLEMENTING AGREEMENT THAT IS LITTLE CHANGED FROM THE OCTOBER 28, 1992, DRAFT. IN THE AFTERNOON MEETINGS, HRYSHCHENKO, TARASIUK, AND BUTEYKO ALL CLAIMED THAT THE GOU POSITION ON ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER START, THE LISBON PROTOCOL, AND THE NPT REMAINS UNCHANGED. END SUMMARY.

EARLY DEACTIVATION

3. GOODBY PASSED TO KRYZHKO A NON-PAPER CONTAINING THE TALKING POINTS ON EARLY DEACTIVATION FROM REF A AND REVIEWED THE MAJOR POINTS. KRYZHKO SAID THE PAPER WOULD BE STUDIED AND A RESPONSE PROVIDED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.

UMBRELLA AGREEMENT

4. THE U.S. SIDE PROVIDED A NEW DRAFT AGREEMENT TO THE UKRAINIAN SIDE THAT INCLUDED SEVERAL MODIFICATIONS TO ADDRESS CONCERNS RAISED BY THE UKRAINIANS. THESE MODIFICATIONS INCLUDED LEGAL ISSUES AS WELL AS THE CHANGE TO THE PREAMBULAR REFERENCE TO START AND THE LISBON PROTOCOL AUTHORIZED BY REF B. AFTER THE UKRAINIANS HAD STUDIED THE NEW DRAFT, THE SIDES MET AND

HRYSCHENKO INDICATED THAT THE NEW U.S. DRAFT HAD REDUCED THE NUMBER OF ISSUES TO 3 -- 2 LEGAL ISSUES AND THE REFERENCE TO START AND LISBON. GOODBY ASKED IF THE UKRAINIAN SIDE WOULD BE PREPARED TO SIGN THE AGREEMENT IF THESE THREE ISSUES WERE RESOLVED. HRYSHCHENKO REPLIED THAT, EVEN IN THAT CASE, HE WOULD STILL NEED TO SUBMIT THE AGREEMENT TO THE GOVERNMENT FOR APPROVAL, IN CONSULTATION WITH THE RADA. HRYSHCHENKO SAID THIS PROCESS COULD NOT BEGIN IMMEDIATELY BECAUSE KEY MINISTERS WERE AT THE RADA DEFENDING THE ECONOMIC PLAN. GOODBY THEN PROPOSED THAT THE GOU PREPARE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE A LETTER TO BE SENT TO SECSTATE, HIMSELF, OR ANY OTHER APPROPRIATE USG OFFICIAL, LAYING OUT THE CHANGES UKRAINE NEEDS IN THE DRAFT TEXT IN ORDER TO SIGN THE AGREEMENT. THE U.S. WOULD THEN RESPOND TO THIS LETTER THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS AND, IF THE RESPONSE WERE POSITIVE, GOODBY WOULD BE PREPARED TO RETURN TO KIEV TO SIGN. HRYSHCHENKO ACCEPTED GOODBY'S PROPOSAL AND EXPRESSED HIS HOPE THAT THE AGREEMENTS COULD BE SIGNED IN THE NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS.

SNDV DISMANTLEMENT

5. THE SIDES COMPLETED DISCUSSION OF THE AGREEMENT TEXT AND THE FOUR U.S.-PROPOSED ANNEXES. ROSZAK AND OVCHARENKO SUMMARIZED THE PROGRESS AS FOLLOWS: THERE ARE 6-8 ISSUES IN THE MAIN TEXT WHICH ARE NOT RESOLVED, INCLUDING THE UKRAINIAN REQUEST TO DELETE REFERENCE TO START IN THE PREAMBLE AND THE REFERENCE TO ASSISTANCE BEING PROVIDED FOR QUOTE EXPEDITING UNQUOTE THE

ELIMINATION OF SYSTEMS; THE USE OF THE TERM QUOTE MAY PROVIDE UNQUOTE; ADDITION OF A QUOTE BUY UKRAINIAN UNQUOTE ANNEX; AND PROVISIONS TO ALLOW UKRAINIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE U.S. CONTRACT SELECTION PROCESS. ROSZAK STATED THAT SEVERAL OF THESE ISSUES WILL REQUIRE RESOLUTION IN WASHINGTON. THE ANNEXES HAVE ALSO BEEN REVIEWED TO THE MUTUAL SATISFACTION OF THE SIDES, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE UKRAINIAN REQUESTS FOR EIGHT ADDITIONAL INCINERATORS, NITROGEN/OXYGEN PRODUCING MACHINERY, HEPTYL STORAGE, AND MEDICAL EQUIPMENT FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE. THESE ISSUES WILL REQUIRE FURTHER EXPERT DISCUSSIONS. ROSZAK OFFERED TO RETURN FOR THESE DISCUSSIONS IN MID-SEPTEMBER OR EARLY OCTOBER. THE UKRAINIAN EXPERTS PREFERRED THE EARLIER DATE, BUT THE HEAD OF THEIR DELEGATION SAID HE WOULD PROVIDE A DATE

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THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.

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SNDV - RAILCAR SUBGROUP

6. CDR DEMEO MET WITH MR. VALERI BUBNOV, CHIEF DESIGNER OF AZOVRAILCAR. BUBNOV ASKED IF THE U.S. HAD DECIDED WHERE THE AMYL TANKER RAILCARS WOULD BE MADE. DEMEO SAID IT WOULD BE DECIDED UNDER U.S. COMPETITIVE BIDDING PROCEDURES. DEMEO ASKED FOR AN EXPLANATION OF HOW EACH PIECE OF PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT ON THE UKRAINIAN ONE MILLION USD LIST WOULD BE USED; HE ALSO ASKED FOR THE RAILCAR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. BUBNOV SAID HE WOULD PROVIDE THE PRODUCTION LIST WITH EXPLANATION OF INTENDED USES THE NEXT MORNING, AND COL NUSULYCH SAID

HE WOULD WORK WITH BUBNOV TO GET A LIST OF RAILCAR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS DELIVERED TO THE U.S. EMBASSY IN ONE WEEK.

EXPORT CONTROL

7. THE SIDES MET TO GO OVER THE DRAFT EXPORT CONTROL AGREEMENTS. MR. SCHERBA, WHO WAS LEADING THE UKRAINIAN SIDE, JOKINGLY SAID THE TEXT WAS FINE EXCEPT FOR ARTICLE VIII, WHICH PROVIDES FOR ENTRY INTO FORCE UPON NOTIFICATION THAT THE UMBRELLA AGREEMENT HAS ENTERED INTO FORCE. AMB. NEWLIN, LEADING THE U.S. SIDE, EXPRESSED OPTIMISM THAT THIS WOULD OCCUR SOON AND REITERATED HIS STATEMENT OF JULY 7 THAT SUBSTANTIAL EXPORT CONTROL ASSISTANCE WAS DEPENDENT ON ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE UMBRELLA. SCHERBA NOTED THAT THE AGREEMENTS WERE BETWEEN MINISTRIES OF DEFENSE AND THAT THIS COULD CAUSE DIFFICULTIES SINCE UKRAINE HAD NOT YET DECIDED WHAT BODY WOULD BE IN CHARGE OF EXPORT CONTROLS. NEWLIN EXPLAINED THE OPERATION OF CLAUSES PERMITTING THE DESIGNATION OF OTHER ORGANIZATIONS TO IMPLEMENT THE AGREEMENT AND, WITH RESPECT TO THE U.S. SIDE, EXPLAINED THAT WHILE DOD WOULD DISBURSE FUNDS AND OVERSEE IMPLEMENTATION, STATE WOULD COORDINATE VARIOUS AGENCIES INVOLVED IN EXPORT CONTROLS AND THE WORK SCHEDULE WOULD BE COORDINATED WITH THE EMBASSY AS WELL AS THE GOU. SCHERBA SAID THIS WOULD MAKE THINGS MUCH EASIER FOR HIS SIDE. AFTERWARDS, AGREED ENGLISH AND UKRAINIAN TEXTS WERE EXCHANGED. THEY COULD NOT BE

FORMALLY CONFORMED BECAUSE THE UMBRELLA AGREEMENT, INCLUDING ITS TITLE, WAS STILL UNDER NEGOTIATION. THE UKRAINIANS WERE POSITIVE AND EAGER TO PROCEED ONCE THE UMBRELLA AGREEMENT ENTERS INTO FORCE.

GGCL

8. DEMEO MET WITH TWO MOD COLONELS WHO WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR SETTING UP THE GGCL. (COMMENT: THIS IS THE FOURTH DIFFERENT GROUP THE U.S. SIDE HAS MET WITH OVER THE PAST YEAR CLAIMING TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR SETTING UP THE GGCL. END COMMENT.) THE UKRAINIAN SIDE STARTED BY OFFERING THEIR OWN VERSION OF THE IMPLEMENTING AGREEMENT. WHEN DEMEO SAID THE U.S. DRAFT SHOULD BE THE DOCUMENT TO BE WORKED FROM, THE UKRAINIANS OFFERED SEVERAL CHANGES, INCLUDING DELETING REFERENCE TO THE START AND INF TREATIES. DEMEO EXPLAINED THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE GGCL WAS TO SUPPORT THE MESSAGE REQUIREMENTS OF THESE TWO TREATIES. THE

UKRAINIAN SIDE ARGUED THAT, AS FAR AS THE INF MISSILES WENT, THESE MISSILES HAD BEEN REMOVED FROM UKRAINIAN TERRITORY AND THE INF TREATY DID NOT APPLY. THEY ALSO STATED THAT CHANGES TO THE UMBRELLA AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE REFLECTED IN THIS IMPLEMENTING AGREEMENT. DEMEO SAID ALL COMMENTS ON THE IMPLEMENTING AGREEMENT WOULD BE PASSED TO THE U.S. LAWYERS BUT SUGGESTED THE DISCUSSIONS STICK TO THE TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF THE GGCL. THE UKRAINIAN SIDE ALSO WANTED TO DELETE THE

REQUIREMENT FOR UKRAINE TO PAY FOR ONE OF THE COMMUNICATIONS CIRCUITS AND ASKED FOR AN EXPLANATION OF OTHER COSTS. DEMEO EXPLAINED THE GGCL INSTALLATION PLAN AND THAT THE U.S. WOULD PAY FOR THE ANNEX A EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES AND ONE CIRCUIT; THE U.S. EXPECTED THE UKRAINIAN SIDE TO PAY FOR THE OTHER CIRCUIT. HE FURTHER EXPLAINED THE TWO PHASES OF INSTALLATION (PHASE ONE - INTERIM EQUIPMENT AND THE U.S. CIRCUIT AND THEN PHASE TWO - FINAL EQUIPMENT AND UKRAINE CIRCUIT). HE ADDED THAT THE JOINT U.S.-UKRAINE GGCL TECHNICAL COMMITTEE, WHICH WOULD MEET AFTER THE IMPLEMENTING AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED, WOULD WORK OUT ALL DETAILS OF INSTALLATION AND TIMELINES FOR THE PHASES. THE UKRAINIAN SIDE SAID THEY FELT THAT THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE WOULD BE AN EFFECTIVE WAY FOR THEM TO WORK OUT THE TECHNICAL DETAILS.

GOODBY AFTERNOON MEETING WITH HRYSHCHENKO

9. GOODBY PASSED TO HRYSHCHENKO NON-PAPERS CONTAINING REF A POINTS ON EARLY DEACTIVATION AND ON START AND THE LISBON PROTOCOL, TALKING HRYSHCHENKO THROUGH BOTH PAPERS. IN RESPONSE TO THE LATTER, HRYSHCHENKO ASSERTED THAT ACCEDING TO THE NPT IS NOT AS EASY FOR UKRAINE AS THE U.S. SIDE CLAIMS, BECAUSE THE RADA'S DECLARATION OF OWNERSHIP OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON UKRAINIAN SOIL PUTS UKRAINE (AND KAZAKHSTAN, IF THEY MAKE A SIMILAR DECLARATION) IN A POSITION NOT ANALOGOUS TO ANY OTHER STATE WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON ITS

TERRITORY. HRYSHCHENKO DID CONFIRM THAT THE GOU POSITION HAS NOT CHANGED ON START, THE LISBON PROTOCOL, OR NPT ADHERENCE, AND HE SAID (WITHOUT A TRACE OF IRONY) THAT STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECT THAT START REQUIRES THAT UKRAINE REDUCE ONLY PROPORTIONALLY TO RUSSIA ARE NOT THE OFFICIAL POSITION OF THE GOU. IN A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE STATUS OF UKRAINIAN-RUSSIAN NEGOTIATIONS, HE COMPLAINED THAT THE DOCUMENT THAT HAS BEEN UNDER PREPARATION IS ONE-SIDED AND INDICATED HIS PREFERENCE FOR A TRILATERAL APPROACH.

10. AT THE END OF THE MEETING, GOODBY REVIEWED HIS UNDERSTANDING OF WHERE THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE UMBRELLA AGREEMENT STAND AND RECEIVED CONFIRMATION FROM HRYSHCHENKO THAT THE GOU WILL PREPARE A LETTER ASAP LAYING OUT THE CHANGES IT NEEDS IN THE DOCUMENT IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO SIGN IT.

GOODBY MEETING WITH DFM TARASIUK

11. GOODBY, ACCOMPANIED BY CHARGE BYRNES, HIGHLIGHTED FOR TARASIUK REF A TALKING POINTS ON START AND THE LISBON PROTOCOL, NOTING THAT HE HAD REVIEWED THE POINTS IN DEPTH WITH HRYSHCHENKO. TARASIUK ASKED GOODBY WHO HAD MADE THE STATEMENTS CITED IN THE U.S. POINTS

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CALLING INTO QUESTION THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE UKRAINIAN
SIDE LETTER TO THE LISBON PROTOCOL. WHEN GOODBY
REPLIED THAT IT WAS OFFICIALS IN KIEV, TARASIUK SAID
THAT PRESIDENTIAL COMMITMENTS COULD BE AMENDED ONLY BY

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THE PRESIDENT OR THE PARLIAMENT. REGARDING STATEMENTS
THAT START REQUIRES UKRAINE ONLY TO REDUCE ITS
STRATEGIC FORCES PROPORTIONATELY TO RUSSIA, TARASIUK
SAID THIS WAS A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION OF THE
PRESIDENT'S LETTER, ON WHICH IT WAS NECESSARY FOR ALL
PARTIES TO REACH A COMMON CONCLUSION. TO THE BEST OF
HIS KNOWLEDGE, THE LETTER, INCLUDING ITS REFERENCE TO
THE ELIMINATION OF ALL STRATEGIC WEAPONS, IS LINKED TO
THE PROVISIONS OF START. IT WAS ALSO A MISTAKE WHEN A
UKRAINIAN OFFICIAL MADE A STATEMENT ABOUT START NOT
COVERING SS-24S; ALL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS ARE CERTAINLY
COVERED BY START. GOODBY RESPONDED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD
THIS TO MEAN THAT GOU POLICY REMAINED UNCHANGED, WHICH
HE FOUND REASSURING.

12. TARASIUK ASKED IF GOODBY HAD ANY INFORMATION ON
EARLY DEACTIVATION, AND GOODBY RESPONDED BY REVIEWING
REF A POINTS ON SS-24S. TARASIUK DESCRIBED THE
POLITICAL SENSITIVITY OF THIS ISSUE, ASKING THAT THE
USG NOT PRESS PUBLICLY ON IT. HE SAID THE GOU SHOULD
BE ABLE TO RESPOND QUICKLY ON THE U.S. SUGGESTION OF A
WORKING GROUP TO DEAL WITH TECHNICAL DETAILS. A KEY
ISSUE, HE SAID, IS FAIR COMPENSATION FOR THE HEU AND
OTHER MATERIALS RESULTING FROM DISMANTLEMENT. HE
CLAIMED THAT MAMEDOV IS TRYING TO CONVINCE THE USG THAT
THERE IS A SATISFACTORY RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN AGREEMENT,
BUT THIS IS NOT COMPLETELY TRUE. UKRAINE HAS TWO
OPTIONS: TO SEEK BILATERAL AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA, WHICH
HAS THUS FAR FAILED, OR TO SEEK A TRILATERAL AGREEMENT.
TARASIUK PRESSED FOR A COPY OF A U.S. DRAFT TRILATERAL
AGREEMENT, CLAIMING TALBOTT HAD SAID GOODBY MIGHT BE

ABLE TO PROVIDE ONE. GOODBY REPLIED THAT THIS WAS NOT
THE CASE, THAT HE HAD TALKED TO TALBOTT AND THE ONLY
THING HE HAD TO PROVIDE ON EARLY DEACTIVATION WAS THE
POINTS HE HAD CONVEYED ON SS-24S. TARASIUK ARGUED
AGAINST THE U.S. AND RUSSIA DISCUSSING A SUBJECT WITH
DIRECT IMPACT ON UKRAINIAN INTERESTS WITHOUT UKRAINE
BEING DULY INFORMED, ESPECIALLY GIVEN THE KIND OF
RELATIONSHIP THE U.S. AND UKRAINE WERE SEEKING TO
DEVELOP. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT THE GOU HAD FOUND IN
ITS INDIRECT CONTACTS WITH THE USG THAT THE U.S. WAS
SEEKING TO OBTAIN RESULTS SATISFACTORY TO UKRAINE, AND
IT APPRECIATED THE EFFORTS OF TALBOTT AND OTHER USG
OFFICIALS.

13. GOODBY AND HRYSHCHENKO BOTH REPORTED ON THE
RESULTS OF THEIR NEGOTIATIONS ON THE UMBRELLA
AGREEMENT, AGREEING THAT THEY HAD MADE GOOD PROGRESS
AND THAT THE U.S. SIDE HAD MOVED ABOUT AS FAR AS IT
COULD ON THE VARIOUS ISSUES. GOODBY PRESSED FOR A
RAPID RESPONSE TO HIS REQUEST FOR A LETTER LAYING OUT
UKRAINIAN NEEDS IN ORDER TO SIGN, SUGGESTING THAT, IF
THE RESPONSE WERE LIMITED TO ONE OR TWO IDEAS SUGGESTED
BY HRYSHCHENKO, THE AGREEMENT COULD BE MOVED QUICKLY TO
CLOSURE. THIS WOULD OPEN THE WAY FOR CONCLUDING A
NUMBER OF IMPLEMENTING AGREEMENTS AND GETTING
ASSISTANCE FLOWING RAPIDLY, NOT ONLY IN THE AREAS
CURRENTLY UNDER DISCUSSION BUT ALSO ON SUBJECTS SUCH AS
DEFENSE CONVERSION AND HOUSING.

GOODBY MEETING WITH NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR BUTEYKO

14. BUTEYKO EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT THAT THE UMBRELLA
AGREEMENT WAS NOT BEING SIGNED, SAYING THAT THE GOU HAD
HOPED IT COULD BE COMPLETED AND KRAVCHUK HAD EMPOWERED
KRYZHKO TO SIGN IT. (COMMENT: BUTEYKO APPEARED TO BE
UNDER THE MISTAKEN IMPRESSION THAT KRYZHKO, NOT
HRYSHCHENKO, HAD LED THE UKRAINIAN SIDE ON UMBRELLA
NEGOTIATIONS. END COMMENT.) HE ASKED WHAT ASSISTANCE
WAS NEEDED FROM KRAVCHUK TO FACILITATE CONCLUSION OF
THE AGREEMENT. GOODBY REVIEWED THE STATE OF THE
NEGOTIATIONS, CONCLUDING THAT THE NEGOTIATING STAGE WAS
ESSENTIALLY FINISHED, THAT HE THOUGHT THE MFA WAS
BASICALLY SATISFIED WITH THE OUTCOME, AND THAT THE
DRAFT SHOULD NOW GO TO THE POLITICAL LEVEL FOR FINAL
RESOLUTION. HE ADDED THAT, IF THE UMBRELLA WERE
CONCLUDED, THE SNDV AGREEMENT SHOULD FALL INTO PLACE AS
WELL. A COMPLICATION WAS THE NEED FOR RADA APPROVAL,
WHICH COULD SUBSTANTIALLY DELAY EIF AND THE PROVISION
OF ASSISTANCE. THUS, KRAVCHUK COULD HELP IN TWO WAYS:
BY GETTING TO THE U.S. QUICKLY THE LETTER LAYING OUT
CHANGES UKRAINE NEEDS TO SIGN THE UMBRELLA, AND BY
HELPING WITH THE RADA SITUATION, SEEING IF THERE IS
SOME WAY TO CONSIDER THE UMBRELLA INFORMALLY OR
OTHERWISE EXPEDITE THINGS.

15. BUTEYKO THEN REHEARSED A LIST OF UKRAINIAN
COMPLAINTS ABOUT THE DENUCLEARIZATION PROCESS, TO WIT:
UKRAINE HAS GOTTEN RID OF ALL TACTICAL NUCLEAR SYSTEMS,
BEGUN TO DISMANTLE A REGIMENT OF SS-19S, AND MADE A
SERIES OF POLITICAL COMMITMENTS, WHILE ALL THE U.S. HAS

DONE IN RESPONSE IS MAKE
A SERIES OF UNREALIZED
PROMISES OF ECONOMIC AND MUNN-LUGAR ASSISTANCE. GOODBY
REBUTTED THESE ARGUMENTS FORCEFULLY, INCLUDING BY
NOTING THAT, IN HIS CASE, HE HAD BEEN TRYING TO COME TO
KIEV SINCE APRIL TO NEGOTIATE SSD ASSISTANCE AND THE
GOU HAD REFUSED TO RECEIVE HIM.

16. TURNING TO EARLY DEACTIVATION, GOODBY SUMMARIZED
REF A POINTS AND BUTEYKO EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE
NEW U.S. POSITION WHILE ASKING FOR SENSITIVITY TO
UKRAINE'S POLITICAL SITUATION. GOODBY THEN SUMMARIZED
REF A POINTS ON START AND THE LISBON PROTOCOL, SAYING
HIS DISCUSSION OF THIS TOPIC AT THE MFA LED HIM TO
BELIEVE THAT THE UKRAINIAN POSITION HAD NOT CHANGED.
BUTEYKO REPLIED THAT THE SIDE LETTER WAS WRITTEN BY THE
PRESIDENT AND HE HAD NOT WITHDRAWN IT. HOWEVER, HE

WANTED TO DRAW GOODBY'S ATTENTION TO THE SECOND PART OF
THE LETTER, WHICH SAYS THAT UKRAINE WILL ELIMINATE
WEAPONS IN THE CONTEXT OF ITS NON-NUCLEAR STATUS. THIS
STATEMENT WAS SUBJECT TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS.
(COMMENT: THE MEETING CLOSED WITHOUT BUTEYKO'S
EXPLAINING THIS LAST POINT. END COMMENT.)

BYRNES

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